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INTRODUCTION

In the past, surface water often hindered the development of land.
A building could not be built upon a creek bed; a swamp was unfit for
farming; and, certain land in a valley was unusable because of the runoff of water from the mountains. Today's technology has enabled us
to overcome these excess water problems and make the land productive. However, the land is often made productive at the expense of
neighboring lands upon which the excess water is cast. Thus, a drainage problem is created.
A drainage problem occurs whenever water comes upon a person's
land and that person, or his agent, acts to alter the natural disposition
of the water, thereby causing harm to the property of another. The
alteration can be the result of installing pipes,' paving land which normally absorbs water, 2 digging ditches,3 constructing highways,4 fillin
low land,5 changing the grade of land,6 or building embankments.
The harm caused by these alterations may be damage from flooding,'
erosion,9 deposits of mud, debris and silt,' 0 or the mere presence of
water." Even though there is injury, not every drainage problem gives
rise to a cause of action. According to Pendergrastv. Aiken, 2 liability
only occurs when the harmful interference with the flow of surface waters is unreasonable and causes substantial damage.
THE CASE
In Pendergrast,the plaintiffs were the owners of a tract of land on
U.S. Highway 25 in Buncombe County, North Carolina on which there
had been erected a brick and concrete-block building. The building
1.
(1976).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Dize Awning & Tent Co. v. City of Winston-Salem, 29 N.C. App. 297, 224 S.E.2d 257
Speight v. Griffin, 25 N.C. App. 222, 212 S.E.2d 898 (1975).
Jenkins v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 110 N.C. 438, 15 S.E. 193 (1892).
Youmans v. City of Hendersonville, 175 N.C. 574, 96 S.E. 45 (1918).
Bradley v. Texaco, Inc., 7 N.C. App. 300, 172 S.E.2d 87 (1970).
Ayers v. Tomrich Corp., 17 N.C. App. 263, 193 S.E.2d 764 (1973).
McClees v. Sikes, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 308 (1854).
Braswell v. Highway Commission, 250 N.C. 508, 108 S.E.2d 912 (1959).
Sherrill v. Highway Commission, 264 N.C. 643, 142 S.E.2d 653 (1965).
Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 227 N.C. 561, 42 S.E.2d 905 (1947).
Clark v. Norfolk Southern R.R., 168 N.C. 415, 84 S.E. 702 (1915).
293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977).
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contained an upper floor and a basement with a dirt floor, and housed
three commercial establishments. About 30 feet behind the building,
there was a small creek flowing in a southerly direction and containing
water throughout the year.
The defendants owned the land immediately to the south of the
plaintiffs' property. The land was undeveloped and between four and
six feet below the level of the adjacent highway. The creek originating
on the plaintiffs' land passed through the defendants' property in a natural drainage ditch before coming to Allen Avenue, which bordered
the defendants' southern boundry. There the water flowed beneath the
street through two 24-inch culverts.
In 1972, the defendants entered into an agreement with a contractor
to have their land filled with dirt. It was decided that the defendants
would order 274 feet of 36-inch corrugated pipe to carry the creek
which would otherwise be covered with dirt. Both the defendant and
the contractor testified that the other of the two had recommended the
36-inch pipes.
In March of 1973, after the pipe had been installed, there was a substantial but normal rainfall. The creek exceeded its banks and flooded
the basement of the plaintiffs' building for the first time since they had
moved onto their property in 1962. In April and May there was similar flooding. On May 27, the area received four inches of rain in a 12hour period. After this exceptionally heavy rain, the creek flooded the
plaintiffs' basement to a depth of over five feet. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that there were also two other flooding incidents.
At trial, a civil engineer testified for the plaintiffs that, according to
sound engineering practices, the defendants should have installed
drainage facilities capable of handling a flow of 800 gallons of water
per minute. According to his calculations, the 36-inch pipe actually
installed had a maximum capacity of 260 gallons per minute and "was
completely inadequate to carry the water."'"
After all of the evidence had been heard, the trial court judge submitted the following issues to the jury: "(1) Did the defendants Aiken
create a nuisance by installing and covering a 36-inch drain across their
property? (2) If so, did defendants Aiken thereby cause damage to
plaintiffs' property? (3) What amount of damages, if any, are plaintiffs entitled to recover of the defendants Aiken?"' 4 The jury responded "Yes" to the first question, "No" to the second question, and
did not answer the third. Thereupon, judgment on the verdict was entered for the defendants and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Ap13. Id. at 205, 236 S.E.2d at 789.
14. Id. at 206, 236 S.E.2d at 790.
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peals affirmed with one judge dissenting and the case was appealed to
the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The first step the Court took toward the resolution of this case was to
analyze the existing rules for dealing with drainage problems. The
Court concluded that the reasonable use rule afforded the soundest approach to surface water drainage problems and therefore formally
adopted the rule. Since the trial court's instructions to the jury dealt,
in part, with the civil law rule, the Court held that there was error in
the charge. In addition, the Court held that it was error to instruct the
jury that they might find that the defendants had created a nuisance
without finding that there was substantial damage to the plaintiffs.
Due to the errors committed, the Court ruled that there must be a new
trial.
BACKGROUND

Drainage problems generally concern either diffused surface water,
watercourses or flood waters. Diffused surface waters "are those which
accumulate from rains, melting snows or springs, diffuse themselves
over the surface of the ground and seek a lower level by force of gravity
without flowing in a defined channel."'" A watercourse is a stream of
water which flows within well-defined banks and channel.' 6 The flow
of water need not be continuous,'" and the size of the stream is not
material."i In addition a watercourse may be either a natural watercourse, such as rivers, creeks and branches, or it may be an artificial
watercourse, such as canals and ditches.' 9 Flood waters are waters
above the highest line of the ordinary flood of a watercourse, but they
become diffused surface waters if they permanently leave the main current of the watercourse. 20
Most jurisdictions use these classifications when solving drainage
problems and some jurisdictions apply slightly different rules to the differing classifications. 2 1 The North Carolina courts, however, have
chosen to combine these classifications into the broader category of surface waters.2 2 Thus, diffused surface waters, watercourses and flood
waters are controlled by one rule in North Carolina.
There are three basic rules governing the resolution of surface water
15. Midgett v. Highway Commission, 260 N.C. 241, 244, 132 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1963).
16. Levene v. City of Salem, 191 Or. 182, 190, 229 P.2d 255, 259 (1951).
17. ReRuwe v. Morrison, 28 Wash.2d 797, 810, 184 P.2d 273, 280 (1947).
18. Reed v. Jacobson, 160 Neb. 245, 248, 69 N.W.2d 881, 884 (1955).
19. Darr v. Carolina Aluminum Co., 215 N.C. 768, 771, 3 S.E.2d 434, 436 (1939).
20. 260 N.C. at 244, 132 S.E.2d at 604.
21. Weeks v. McKay, 85 Idaho 617, 382 P.2d 788 (1963); Garbarino v. Van Cleave, 214 Or.
554, 330 P.2d 28 (1958).
22. 293 N.C. at 206, 236 S.E.2d at 790.
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drainage problems. The first of these is the common enemy rule. 23
Basically, the rule recognizes diffused surface water and flood water as
a common enemy from which every person may protect his land.
Under the rule, one may make alterations to his land to reject or dispose of those unwanted waters without incurring liability for his acts.24
The common enemy rule originated in the courts of Massachusetts
around the middle of the ninteenth century.2 5 It was based upon the
maxim cuus est so/um, ejus usque ad coelum et ad infernos, and was
designed to give each landowner "the free and unfettered control of his
own land. .... ,,2' The New Jersey courts first applied the name
"common enemy" to the rule in 187527 and thereafter, the rule was
adopted in other jurisdictions as well.
When applied in its strictest form, the common enemy rule sometimes resulted in harsh decisions. To provide for a more equitable resolution of surface water drainage problems, the rule underwent a
gradual modification or abandonment by the courts. Today there are
which follow the common enemy rule in its strictest
no jurisdictions
28
form.
There is no standard modified common enemy rule and the modifications of the rule differ slightly in various states. The rule has been
modified by adding requirements of reasonableness, 29 necessity, 30 or
necessity and due care.' Thus the modifications take the rule that a
landowner may fight off surface water and add the qualification that he
"do so without injury to such adjoining proprietor,"3 2 or "unless he
unnecessarily injures or damages another for his own protection,"33 or
"that he must exercise his rights not wantonly, unnecessarily or carecare as not to injure needlessly
lessly, but in good faith and with such
34
the property of the adjacent owner."
A second rule governing surface water drainage problems is the civil
law rule 35 "which recognizes a natural servitude of natural drainage as
23.
was not
24.
25.
(1940).
26.

Although the common enemy rule is sometimes referred to as "the common law rule," it
a part of the common law. 3 H. FARNHAM,WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 889b (1904).
Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal.2d 396, 400, 412 P.2d 529, 531, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (1966).
Kenyon & McClure, Inte ferences with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REV. 891, 902
Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 106, 109 (1865).

27. Town of Union v. Durkes, 38 N.J.L. 21 (1875).

28. Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975).
29. King v. Cade, 205 Okla. 666, 240 P.2d 88 (1951).
30. Leader v. Matthews, 192 Ark. 1049, 95 S.W.2d 1138 (1936).
31. Nichol v. Yocum, 173 Neb. 298, 113 N.W.2d 195 (1962).

32. Gulf,C.S. & F. Ry. Co. v. Richardson, 42 Okla. 457, 460, 141 P. 1107, 1109 (1914).
33.

192 Ark. at 1054, 95 S.W.2d at 1140.

34. Mason v. Lamb, 189 Va. 348, 354, 53 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1949).
35. For a complete discussion of the civil law rule in North Carolina prior to the adoption of
the reasonable use rule see Note, Dispasition of Dorused Surface Waters inNorth Carolina, 47 N.C.

L. REv. 205 (1968).
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between adjoining lands, so that the lower owner must accept the surface water which naturally drains onto his land but, on the other hand,
the upper owner cannot change the natural drainage so as to increase
the natural burden. 3 6 The rule, which is sometimes referred to as the
natural flow rule, is based upon the maxim aqua currit et debet currere,
ut curreresolebat (water runs and ought to run, as it has used to run),
and apparently originated in Roman Law and the Code Napoleon.37
The first American jurisdiction to apply the rule was Louisiana in
1812.38
As the use of the rule grew, its application sometimes resulted in
extreme consequences. 3 9 Like the common enemy rule, the strict civil
law has been adandoned or modified in every jurisdiction. Modifications of the rule generally require that the upper owner act reasonwas announced in
ably.' The most complete
4 1 modification of the rule
a recent California case:
It is properly a consideration in land development problems whether
the utility of the possessor's use of his land whether the utility of the
possessor's use of his land outweighs the gravity of the harm which
results from his alteration of the flow of surface waters .... If the
weight is on the side of him who alters the natural watercourse, then he
has acted reasonably and without liability; if the harm to the lower
landowner is unreasonably severe, then the economic costs incident to
the expulsion of surface waters must be borne by the upper owner
whose development caused the damage. If the facts should indicate
both parties conducted themselves reasonably, then courts are bound
by our well-settled civil law rule.42
A third rule used in resolving surface water drainage problems is the
rule of reasonable use. The rule states that "Each possessor is legally
privileged to make a reasonable use of his land, even though the flow of
surface water is altered thereby and causes some harm to others, but
liability is incurred when his harmful interference with the flow of surface waters is unreasonable and causes substantial damage. ' 43 The
reasonableness of the use is generally considered to be a question of
fact which should be submitted to a properly instructed jury.'
The reasonable use rule originated in the courts of New Ham pshire
in 18624- and was adopted by the Minnesota courts in 1894.7 For
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

260 N.C. at 246, 132 S.E.2d at 603.
Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal.2d 396, 402, 412 P.2d 529, 532, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (1966).
Orleans Navigation Co. v. New Orleans, 2 Mart. 214 (1812).
Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421 (1958).
Whitman v. Forney, 181 Md. 652, 31 A.2d 630 (1943).
Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal.2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966).
Id. at 410, 412 P.2d at 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. at 216, 236 S.E.2d at 796.
Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975).
Basset v. Company, 43 N.H. 569 (1862).
Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn. 436, 61 N.W. 462 (1894).
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over half a century these two states remained as the only American
jurisdictions that followed the rule.47 Since then, the reasonable use
rule has been adopted in full by eight other jurisdictions.48
Although there are specialized rules of liability which are used in
resolving surface water drainage problems, it is nevertheless necessary
to state the precise basis for such liability. The three major causes of
action upon which liability is most commonly based are trespass, negligence or nuisance.49 It is often possible to allege more than one basis
for the injury5", and the basis chosen may sometimes make a difference
in the outcome of the case.5
Trespass may be used as a basis whenever the unauthorized casting
of water upon the land of another interferes with the owner's exclusive
possession of his land. 2 The interference need not be the result of an
intentional or negligent act, but merely the result of some voluntary
act. 3 A trespass may occur when the flow of water is diverted across
the land of another 4 or when the flow of a stream is obstructed,
55
thereby causing water to be cast upon the land of another landowner.
Another basis upon which one may be liable for creating a surface
water drainage problem is negligence. As in other types of cases, negligence may be used as the basis for a case involving drainage problems
when a duty has been breached and that breach proximately caused
injury to another.56 For example, negligence may be asserted against
one who allows drainage pipes to become clogged and damaged in
breach of his duty to maintain.57
The most frequently stated grounds for asserting liability in surface
water drainage problems is that the unwanted waters constitute a private nuisance. In order to be able to recover on the basis of nuisance,
one must be able to show that there has been an unreasonable interfer47. See Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. at 210, 236 S.E.2d at 793.
48. Weinberg v. Northern Alaska Development Corp., 384 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1963); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Armstrong v. Francis, 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4
(1956); Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977); Jones v. Boeing Co., 153
N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967); Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975); Sanford v. University
of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis.2d 1,224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).
49. Liability may also be based upon the violation of a statute, Smith v. City of Woodstock,
17 Ill. App. 3d 948, 309 N.E.2d 45 (1974), or upon eminent domain, Youmans v. City of Hendersonville, 175 N.C. 574, 96 S.E. 45 (1918).
50. See, e.g., First Kingston Corp. v. Thompson, 223 Ga. 6, 152 S.E.2d 837 (1967).
51. See, e.g., Blocher v. McArthur, 303 S.W.2d 529 ('ex. Civ. App. 1957).
52. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 13 (4th ed. 1971).
53. Id.

54. Casanover v. Villanova Realty Co., 209 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. App. 1948).
55. Mogwood v. Edwards, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 350 (1867).
56. Johnson v. City of Winston-Salem, 239 N.C. 697, 81 S.E.2d 153 (1954).
57. Id.
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ence with the use and enjoyment of one's land." Although the issue as
to what constitutes an unreasonable interference is a question of fact,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides certain guidelines that are
helpful in resolving this issue.5 9 It indicates that the action should be
considered unreasonable if "(a) the gravity of the harm outweighs the
utility of the actor's conduct, or (b) the harm caused by the conduct is
substantial and the financial burden of compensating for this and other
'60
harms does not render infeasible the continuation of the conduct.
In addition, the Restatement lists the following factors as relevant to a
determination of the gravity of the harm:
(a) the extent of harm involved;
(b) the character of the harm involved;
(c) the social value which the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment invaded;
(d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the
character of the locality;
(e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm. 6 '
Also, several factors are given which may be used to determine the
utility of the conduct involved:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the primary purpose of
the conduct;
(b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality;
(c) whether it is impracticable to prevent or avoid the invasion, if the
activity is maintained;
(d) whether it is impracticable to maintain the activity if it is required
to bear the cost of compensating for the invasion.6 2
Once the proper cause of action has been determined, the aggrieved
party must decide on the type of relief he wishes to seek. The two most
commonly sought measures of relief in surface water drainage
problems are damages and injunctions.
Damages are allowed in order to compensate the landowner for the
unreasonable interferences to his land. The method by which the
amount of damages are determined depends upon whether or not the
nuisance is permanent. If the nuisance is permanent the damages are
"the depreciation in the market value of the realty by reason of the
nuisance."6 3 If the nuisance is abatable, then the measure of damages
is "the depreciation in the rental or use value of his property during the
period in which the nuisance exists, plus any special damages. '
58. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822-31 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
60. Id
61. Id

§ 826.
§ 827.

62. Id § 828.
63. D. DOBBs, LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.3 (1973).

64. Id.
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An injunction is sometimes available as a remedy to surface water
drainage problems. In determining whether to grant an injunction, a
court is guided by traditional rules of equity. Thus, an injunction will
be issued under the following circumstances:
When the threatened injury cannot be adequately compensated in
damages at law, or where, under the circumstances of the case, the injured party has no adequate remedy at law. The foundation for the
jurisdiction in such cases is, in general, the irreparable nature of the
injury, the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, the destruction of
it has been enjoyed, or the preventhe estate in the character in which
65
tion of a multiplicity of suits.
ANALYSIS

By eliminating the subclassifications of surface waters, the North
Carolina courts have helped to simplify a needlessly complex area of
the law. In most jurisdictions which do recognize the distinctions
among the classifications, the distinctions seem to make very little difference, with one exception. Regardless of the surface water drainage
rule that a state applies, most states accept the "well-established principle of law that waters flowing in a stream in a natural watercourse
through or adjoining a person's lands could not be diverted by upper
landowners to the damage of lower riparian landowners. '66 Since the
Court has eliminated subclassifications of surface waters, it would appear that in North Carolina watercourses, as well as other surface waters, can be diverted if the diversion is reasonable. This interpretation
would provide equitable results and also provide for the full use and
development of land.
The surface water drainage rules which were discussed by the Court
in Pendergrast each have certain advantages and disadvantages.
Under the strict common enemy rule, every landowner would know
with reasonable certainty what he could do to rid himself of unwanted
surface water without incurring liability. However, he could never be
certain that water would not be cast upon his property by another landowner who was fighting off surface waters. Also, the rule encourages
landowners "to engage in contests of hydraulic engineering in which
might makes right, and breach of the peace is often inevitable. ' 6 7
Court adopted modifications improve the rule since they often prohibit
unnecessary, negligent or unreasonable conduct, but the modifications
do little to discourage hydrologic contests.
65.
66.
293, 298
67.
(1968).

Brown v. Solary, 37 Fla. 102, 110, 19 So. 161, 163 (1896).
Werk v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 104 Cal. App. 2d 599, 609, 232 P.2d
(1951).
Maloney & Plager, Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty7, 8 NAT. REs. J. 72, 78
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The civil law furnishes predictable results in that every landowner
knows that if he interferes with the natural flow of water he will be
liable for any resulting damage. Just as predictably, a landowner
knows that if he improves his property, it will almost always alter the
natural flow of surface water. Because of this, the development of land
will be needlessly stifled under the strict rule.
The reasonable use modification of the civil law rule helps to correct
this situation. It allows a reasonable interference with the natural flow,
but generally does not lead to drainage contests familiar to the common enemy rule. Modifications of the rule, however, have developed on a case by case basis and sometimes apply only to certain
situations. 68 Because of this, the virtue of predictability has been lost
and the law unnecessarily complicated.
The reasonable use rule greatly simplifies the law regarding surface
water drainage problems. Since the rule is based upon tort rather than
property law, many property concepts are no longer involved. Also,
subclassifications of surface waters are no longer essential because all
surface waters are subjected to the single rule of reasonable use. These
simplifications will make drainage cases easier to resolve, and they will
be resolved with greater consistency.
Another advantage of the rule is that it is flexible. Unlike the common enemy rule. Modifications of the rule, however, have develstay abrest of changing times, the reasonable use rule should require no
modifications. As society develops, certain conduct in regard to surface water may increase or decrease in utility and therefore change the
result in a case, but the rule need not be altered to reflect that change in
utility.
One possible disadvantage of the reasonable use rule is lack of predictability. However, the rule is no less predictable than the modified
common enemy rule, or the modified civil law rule. Also, the Restatement of Torts enhances predictability since it lists certain factors to be
considered in determining reasonability.6 9
Under the reasonable use rule, a cause of action for interfering with
surface water drainage will be based upon the law of private nuisance
when the interference is substantial. Since most cases that are resolved
by litigation involve substantial damages, the law of private nuisance
should govern the resolution of most surface water drainage problems.
If there are no substantial damages, then there can be no nuisance,7 °
and recovery must be sought on other grounds.
68. Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. at 215, 236 S.E.2d at 796.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS, supra note 59.
70. Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 124 S.E.2d 809 (1962).
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CONCLUSION

The Court in Pendergrastsaid, "We adopt the reasonable use rule as
an act of clarification-not innovation."'" Their adoption of the rule
was indeed an act of clarification. Surface water drainage problems
may now be resolved under a rule which simply allows one to make a
reasonable use of his land, but which prohibits him from causing an
unreasonable interference with the land of another. This concept is
embodied in the ancient legal maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
(use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another); so the idea can hardly be called an innovation. But the adoption of a rule which clarifies and simplifies a needlessly complex area of
law is an innovation which should be highly regarded.
EDWIN

M.

BRASWELL, JR.

71. 293 N.C. at 218, 236 S.E.2d at 798.
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